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Since the 1980s, a number of fair trial rights and civil 
liberties have been eroded in Australia, particularly in 
respect to summary justice and police powers. This article 
traces the ‘bottom-up’ origins of some of those rights and 
liberties in colonial New South Wales. It focuses on the 
activist Edwin Withers and his interactions with the 
Parramatta magistracy in the mid 1840s. The Withers 
example enables us to see how some fair trial rights and 
civil liberties resulted from community-based social 
activism, which relied upon the legislature and higher 
court authority to become law. The importance of these 
rights — for example, the right to counsel, the right to a 
fair and impartial tribunal and protection against 
arbitrary detention — is demonstrated by the very fact 
that they issued from the working and middle classes and 
are implicated within wider class relationships involving 
residents of a local community. Using archival research 
and qualitative analysis, this article has important 
implications for Australian legal history in relation to the 
adoption of the Jervis Acts 1848 (UK), some of the first 
summary procedure legislation enacted within colonial 
NSW. The article demonstrates how the fair trial rights 
campaign at Parramatta resulted in amendment to the 
adopted Acts in the colony.  
Edwin Augustus Withers was a colonial intellectual and an eccentric. He 
was the proprietor of the Temperance Coffee-House at the settlement of 
Parramatta in colonial New South Wales during the 1840s. Little else is 
known about him. From the day he protested against his illegal conviction 
for a misdescribed charge to the day he was released from Tarban Creek 
 
*  This research is drawn from my current PhD project (Macquarie University) exploring 
the evolution of fair trial rights and criminal process in colonial NSW. My thanks to Diane 
Kirkby, Iain Stewart, Alison Holland and two anonymous reviewers.  
Schofield-Georgeson: ‘Mad’ Edwin Withers  
 
79 
Lunatic Asylum by writ of habeas corpus, Withers wagered his life, sanity 
and liberty for the advancement of fair trial rights in NSW. He consistently 
battled the magistracy and advocated on behalf of working-class 
‘prisoners of the Crown’.1 Such was the vigour of Withers’ activism — 
frequently marked by outraged outbursts — that he regularly attracted 
coverage in Edward Mason’s The Parramatta Chronicle.2 In 1843 Mason, 
too, vowed to protect ‘the prisoners of the crown from all oppression’ and 
‘the labouring poor against the tyranny of the monnied interest [sic]’.3 
Withers’ impassioned protest, however, was not simply the subject of 
early colonial newspaper reportage. It influenced major changes to court 
procedure, particularly at the level of magistrates and quarter sessions 
courts. More importantly, his specific demands shaped key amendments 
to the adoption in the colony of the Jervis Acts 1848, three separate pieces 
of legislation passed together by the British Parliament. They codified a 
range of common law summary criminal process and trial procedures — 
including warrants, court venues, jurisdiction, time limits, rules of 
evidence, manner and form of evidence, depositions, cost of proceedings, 
right to counsel and standard forms — and were one of the most 
significant procedural reforms to criminal law throughout the nineteenth 
century.4 
This article shows how the idealism and social activism of one eccentric 
and determined man, Edwin Withers, gained momentum within a local 
community and subsequently earned the support of reformist politicians 
and lawmakers. The result was the implementation of a range of 
procedural or ‘fair trial’ rights that protected the liberty of the subject 
from a harsh and punitive colonial state. The story of Withers and his 
activism in respect to procedural law is one of many that have emerged in 
exploring criminal procedure and colonialism in NSW. Other examples 
include the efforts of the prisoners of the convict hulk The Phoenix to free 
themselves by writ of habeas corpus, which they issued to the NSW 
Supreme Court after the expiry of their sentence; and the struggle by 
workingmen of the Mechanics School of Arts to decriminalise Master and 
 
1  The Parramatta Chronicle (hereafter TPC), 14 July 1843, unpaginated.  
2  Mason’s approach to newspaper editing is discussed in T. Irving, The Southern Tree of 
Liberty: The Democratic Movement in New South Wales Before 1850 (Sydney: The 
Federation Press, 2006), 145. 
3  TPC, 14 July 1843, unpaginated. 
4  Jervis Acts 11 and 12 Vict. cc 42 and 44 (1848) (UK). 
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Servant law and petition for a stipendiary magistracy to replace honorary 
justices of the peace.5 Withers was just one of several people who called 
from the ‘bottom up’ for reform to the rule of law. His story reveals how 
democratic resistance and dissent were enmeshed within law reform in 
NSW in the mid nineteenth century.  
Consideration of law reform from the bottom up has received scant 
attention from legal and social historians alike. This article draws on a 
combination of both legal and social historical sources and extensive 
analysis of court records, newspaper reports and Hansard. It is 
acknowledged that journalism throughout the nineteenth century was 
notorious for its hyperbole. Caution should be exercised when relying on 
particular claims by a single newspaper as an entirely accurate assertion 
of every fact in every case.  In many cases, however, these records are the 
only remaining verification of important historical events. The method 
used here represents an interdisciplinary integration of legal history and 
social history, demonstrating that experiences of the criminal law among 
colonised peoples involved significant active engagement, not merely 
passive resignation (although the latter also occurred).6 In other words, 
the criminal law was not always coercive; its subjects not always passive. 
Rather, as Terry Irving has shown in respect to the making of liberal 
democracy in colonial NSW, coalitions of working-class people, middle-
class radicals and constitutional reformers sometimes united in protest 
against ruling-class hegemony. Their struggles often evolved into legal 
rights and law reform.7  
 
5  For The Phoenix case, see R. v. Muldoon, Bolton, McKoldrick, McMoren and Horan [1828] 
NSWSupC 62, The Australian, 22 August 1828. See the Australasian Chronicle, 29 
September 1840, for a recount of proceedings at the Sydney Mechanics School of Arts. 
6  See the positivist legal history approach in John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary 
Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). For critique of this approach, see 
Peter Linebaugh, ‘(Marxist) Social History and (Conservative) Legal History: A Reply to 
Professor Langbein,’ New York University Law Review 60.2 (1985): 212-43. For the social 
history approach, see, for instance, Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil 
Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Verso, 2006). As a student of E.P. Thompson 
at Warwick University in the 1970s, Linebaugh co-authored the classic social history 
critique of British criminal law: Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. 
Thompson, Cal Winslow, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
England (New York: Pantheon, 1975). 
7  Irving, The Southern Tree of Liberty, 127-150. 
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By examining specific episodes of resistance within the courtroom, it 
becomes clear that the subjects of criminal law were not prepared to 
accept the repression imposed upon them by various forms of procedural 
law. Rather, they asserted a sense of entitlement to fairness and justice (or 
fair trial rights), which they saw as seriously compromised by various 
practices of courtroom administration.8 Many middle-class and ‘plebeian 
radicals’ were undaunted by the spectacle of criminal process, described 
by historian Douglas Hay as the ‘visible and elaborate manifestation of 
state power’.9 As Australian colonial historian Alan Atkinson has 
suggested, some of those disciplined by ruling-class authority rebelled 
and sought to change their lot in a variety of ways. For those who did so 
by appealing to the authority of the law, the courtroom ‘occupied a sacred 
place’ because it gave voice to a vision of liberty and fairness expressed 
socially.10 Inside the court, legal ‘rights were not an expression of 
authority, but of community and were tied to common tradition and 
circumstances’.11 British historian J.A. Sharpe has made similar findings in 
respect to the experience of working-class litigants in nineteenth century 
industrialising England, who ‘were aware they were acting within a 
context of some sort of community of social values and were concerned 
that their conduct should be, and should be seen to be broadly in accord 
with those values’.12 Operation within a political community was a means 
to obtain individual justice for shared experiences of injustice on a daily 
basis. 
 
8  This is a condensed version of the definition of ‘fair trial rights’ presented in Jeremy Gans, 
Terese Henning, Jill Hunter and Kate Warner, Criminal Process and Human Rights 
(Sydney: The Federation Press, 2011), 32-51. See also Criminal Evidence and Human 
Rights: Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions, ed. Paul Roberts and Jill Hunter 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
9  Irving, The Southern Tree of Liberty, 143-150; Hay et al., Albion’s Fatal Tree, 27. 
10  Alan Atkinson, The Europeans in Australia: A History, Vol. II – Democracy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 4. Atkinson has found that ‘appeals to [the] authority’ of the 
judiciary and the law were one of the four central mechanisms of ‘convict resistance’: 
Alan Atkinson, ‘Four Patterns of Convict Protest,’ Labour History, 37 (1979): 28-51, 30.  
11  Alan Atkinson, ‘The Freeborn Englishman Transported: Convict Rights as a Measure of 
Eighteenth-Century Empire,’ Past and Present 144 (1994): 90. 
12  J.A. Sharpe, ‘“Such Disagreement betwyx Neighbours”: Litigation and Human Relations 
in Early Modern England,’ in Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the 
West, ed. John Bossy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 
167-68. 
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To date, historical investigation of procedural law has disclosed little, if 
any, relationship between criminal process and the role it has played in 
the development of normative fair trial rights, civil liberties and social 
equality.13 This article proposes, however, that there is a historical 
relationship between procedural law and the advancement of both 
normative and materialist rights. A detailed critical understanding of the 
relationship between process and rights is important on two levels. It not 
only reviews existing historical interpretations of colonial legal 
procedure, it also has contemporary resonance. The relationship between 
process and rights is particularly important in a contemporary Australian 
context, in which both state and federal legislatures have, since the 1990s, 
continued to prune back basic fair trial rights and civil liberties in the 
interest of ‘law and order politics’.14 Such attacks on normative rights 
have served only to further disenfranchise the most vulnerable 
defendants within the criminal justice system.15 This is the story of the 
emergence of some of those rights that were asserted for the first time in 
Australian legal history in the working-class heartland of Parramatta in 
mid nineteenth century NSW.  
 
13  Recent jurisprudence in the UK has made some acknowledgment of this relationship but 
does not strictly engage with the fields of legal or social history. See, for instance, The 
Trial on Trial: Volume 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Law, ed. Antony 
Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall, Victor Tadros (London: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
14  See, for example, recent restrictions on the ‘privilege against self-incrimination’ and the 
erosion of the ‘presumption against adverse inference’, as well as increased police 
powers and continuous funding cuts to community legal aid services in NSW. See Tom 
Bucke and David Brown, ‘In Police Custody: Police Powers and Suspects’, Rights under 
the Revised PACE Codes of Practice,’ Home Office Research Study 174 (London: Great 
Britain Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate, 1997), viii; ‘The 
Right to Silence,’ Report 95 (Sydney: NSW Law Reform Commission, 2000), 41-42; David 
Hamer and Gary Edmond, ‘When You Say Nothing At All: NSW and the Right to Silence,’ 
The Conversation, 22 March (2013), http://theconversation.com/when-you-say-
nothing-at-all-nsw-and-the-right-to-silence-12962 (last accessed 4 March 2013). 
15  See Chris Devery, ‘Disadvantage and Crime in New South Wales,’ (Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research, [BOSCAR], 1991). For recent confirmation of these findings, see 
‘New South Wales Criminal Court Statistics 2012’ (BOSCAR, 2013), 3-15; Legal Aid NSW, 
Annual Report 2011–2012 (2012), 12, 135; Aboriginal Legal Service NSW, Annual Report 
2011–2012 (2012), 29. A comparison of the above statistics shows that only about sixty-
five per cent of criminal defendants are legally represented in New South Wales Courts, 
while about just over sixty per cent of these defendants are legally aided or represented 
on a pro bono basis. 
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The story of Edwin Withers falls into three parts. First, we meet Withers 
amid his protests for fair trial rights at the Parramatta Courthouse. 
Second, we find Withers conducting what can only be described as a 
layperson’s or civic legal aid service between the police cells and the 
Parramatta Courthouse. Third, we witness Withers’ political persecution, 
as he is seized and taken to the Tarban Creek Lunatic Asylum on the orders 
of the justices at the Parramatta Quarter Sessions. Each of these parts 
represent a significant development in the history of criminal procedure 
in colonial NSW, demonstrating a popular engagement with the criminal 
law that attempted to democratise its effects upon its working-class and 
colonised subjects. 
Policing and Summary Procedure at Parramatta 
Police brutality and corruption were endemic to policing and summary 
procedure in the colony in the early to mid nineteenth century. Policing 
was conducted by both the military and the local constabulary, both 
skilled in a peculiarly colonial method of law enforcement that combined 
rationalist procedural administration with barbaric brutality.16 Summary 
justice was dispensed by both stipendiary magistrates and honorary 
justices of the peace. ‘Justices’, as they were known, were predominantly 
appointed on the basis of existing wealth and power, as they had been in 
the feudal administration of Britain since the Middle Ages.17 Local 
residents of Parramatta were unimpressed by this system. They voiced 
their rage and frustration with the police force in letters to the editor of 
the district newspapers, The Parramatta Chronicle and The Star and 
 
16  See, for instance, Paula Jane Byrne, Criminal Law and Colonial Subject: New South Wales 
1810–1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Policing in Australia: 
Historical Perspectives, ed. Mark Finnane (Kensington: New South Wales University 
Press, 1987); Alastair Davidson, The Invisible State: The Formation of the Australian State 
1788–1901 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); David Neal, The Rule of Law 
in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993). As various Royal Commissions have demonstrated since the 
1970s, police corruption and brutality continue to be an institutional problem in NSW. 
17  See Hilary Golder, High and Responsible Office: A History of the NSW Magistracy (Sydney 
and Melbourne: Sydney University Press and Oxford University Press, 1991), 3; R.W. 
Connell and Terry H. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History: Documents, Narrative 
and Argument (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1980), 33-34; and, more broadly, John 
Kennedy McLaughlin, ‘The Magistracy in NSW, 1788–1850,’ (LLM. thesis, University of 
Sydney, 1973); Masters, Servants and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562–1955, 
ed. Douglas Hay and Peter Craven (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
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Working Man’s Guardian.18 Edward Mason was editor of both newspapers. 
Examples of letters to the editor and reportage on outbursts by 
defendants in court regarding police conduct appear in numerous editions 
of The Parramatta Chronicle from 30 December 1843 to 27 December 
1845. One letter-writer called the police ‘harpies of the law’; another, 
‘unprincipled wretches’.19 One ticket-of-leave holder called the police ‘a 
set of rascals’ and, when they asked him his name, told them to ‘go to hell 
and find out’. He further stated that he could ‘bring forth three credible 
witnesses’ to prove he was legally at liberty.20 In turn, newspaper 
editorials reflected the people’s grievances.21 Some editions told of ‘police 
irregularities’ and ‘police brutality’ but also spoke of these misdeeds in a 
climate of resistance — ‘an assembled multitude who cried shame on the 
unmanly ruffians [the police]’.22 At times, the editors went as far as 
referring to the Parramatta Chief Constable as ‘that sly old fellow Fox who 
is always running after the women and interrupting their innocent 
amusements’.23 Between 1843 and 1845, the legal column of local papers 
protested the plight of criminal defendants in respect to what it labelled 
‘Police Jurisprudence’ in the streets of Parramatta.24  Withers became part 
of this campaign. 
Through The Parramatta Chronicle, Mason advocated for fair trial rights 
and published weekly accounts of police misconduct, popular unrest and 
proceedings from the Parramatta Courthouse. In a case of ‘assault police’ 
in which ‘the prisoner stoutly denied the charge’, the paper tells us that 
‘no less than three constables belaboured him unmercifully with their 
staves without any occasion’.25 On the same day, another man who faced 
similar charges arising from a separate incident asserted ‘self-defence’ 
after he was ‘attacked by the military and beaten severely’.26 Far from 
 
18  See TPC; The Working Man’s Guardian, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney, 
microfilm, 1843-1845.  
19  TPC, 20 January 1844, 3 
20  TPC, 17 February 1844, 2. 
21  See both TPC and The Working Man’s Guardian, 1843–1845.  
22  TPC, 30 December 1843, 2; TPC, 6 January 1844, 3; TPC, 27 January 1844, 4. 
23  TPC, 20 January 1844, 4. 
24  TPC, 17 February 1844, 1.  
25  TPC, 30 December 1843, 2. 
26  TPC, 30 December 1843, 2. 
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receiving this treatment passively, the lock-up opposite the court erupted. 
According to The Parramatta Chronicle, there were ‘regular riots there 
with the soldiers’.27 Another column told the story of an inquest into the 
death ‘of an unfortunate man named Rogers, who lost his life through the 
brutality of a constable named Barry, of the Sydney Police, who thrust his 
stick into the man’s eye when confined in the watch-house one day last 
week’.28 
The paper retaliated, vowing to ‘fearlessly uphold liberty’ in the face of 
‘the Parramatta Police’, led by the reviled ‘Chief Constable Fox and his 
men’.29 ‘The ruffians’, as the paper labelled the police, beat a suspect in 
front of a crowd of local people.30 On 17 February 1844, The Parramatta 
Chronicle claimed to have commenced ‘warfare with the Parramatta 
Police’.31 In the same edition, the editor drafted an open letter to the 
police, proposing a list or charter of fair trial rights and police procedure.32 
It called on the local magistrate and police to ensure the following 
procedures:  
(i) Court to open at one particular hour every day … 
(ii) Transact all police business in public … 
(iii) Public Magistrate [to] come to the adjudication of every 
case without an intimate knowledge of all its details, as 
derived from ex-parte statements made in the private room … 
(iv) The Police Magistrate never, in any case in which he 
intends to give evidence, to sit as judge … 
(v) The unpaid Magistrates … never to undertake a case singly, 
without possessing at least a competent knowledge of the 
common law of evidence … 
(vi) To guard against professional prejudices … 
 
27  TPC, 30 December 1843, 2. 
28  TPC, 13 January 1844, 4. 
29  TPC, 20 January 1844, 1; TPC, 27 January 1844, 1. 
30  TPC, 17 February 1844, 3. 
31  TPC, 17 February 1844, 3. 
32  The list proposed eleven major reforms to police conduct in the district under the 
banner, ‘Police Jurisprudence,’ TPC, 17 February 1844, 1. 
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(vii) That an accused party is protected by the testimony of 
three credible and respectable … witnesses against the ‘hard-
swearing’ of two interested informers, or … the police … 
(viii) An Impartial and Intelligent judge … 
(ix) To refrain from hunting-up cases … with the aid of 
disguised informers … for the purpose of sharing in fines and 
penalties obtained on conviction by the hard-swearing of their 
constables.33 
In doing so, the editorial reflected recurrent and common complaints 
about summary justice at this time. Mason further identified other 
problems at the local court, including judicial bias toward the police by the 
police magistrate, disregard for the presumption of innocence and the 
concoction of evidence (‘hard-swearing’) by police constables, as well as 
calling for the abolition of the reward system for police constables — a 
system which effectively spurred zealous law enforcement, leading to 
corrupt policing.34 The Parramatta Chronicle demonstrated that these 
concerns were shared by local Parramatta residents who, as the 
newspaper reported, reasserted them week after week as criminal 
defendants at the Parramatta Magistrates Court throughout the mid 
1840s. In so doing, the newspaper fanned the flames of community anger 
toward the administration of summary criminal process. It was amid this 
storm of repression and popular resistance to the criminal law in the 
satellite town of Parramatta that Mr Edwin Withers first came to the 
attention of the local authorities. 
Withers’ Protests for Fair Trial Rights 
Withers was an educated middle-class man in his mid thirties. With his 
wife and three daughters, he arrived in Sydney aboard a commercial 
vessel from London in 1840.35 He cut an unremarkable figure, being a man 
of ‘slight build’, ‘brown eyes’, ‘sallow complexion’ and ‘brown hair’.36 In 
May 1845, he bowed and entered the courtroom at Parramatta Police 
 
33  TPC, 17 February 1844, 1. (Original emphasis retained.) 
34  TPC, 17 February 1844, 1. 
35  Barque of Arrival: ‘Mary Catherine,’ Vessels Arrived, 11 October 1840, State Records New 
South Wales [SRNSW], COD40. Note that Withers had purchased cabins for his entire 
family; they were not ‘steerage’ passengers.  
36  Parramatta Gaol Entrance Books, 1844, SRNSW, 4/6554. 
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Magistrate’s Court, and sat toward the rear. Within minutes, however, he 
was up on his feet protesting about improper courtroom practice and 
police procedure that had led to a number of recent convictions. Police 
Magistrate Elliot halted proceedings. He summoned the protester to the 
bar and asked Withers about his connection with proceedings before the 
court. Withers replied, ‘my connection is the administration of justice’.37 
At this, the magistrate threatened Withers with imprisonment and ejected 
him from the courthouse. 
Withers resumed his courtroom protests twice more that week.38 The 
following Monday, he was at it again. Once more, the magistrate ordered 
Withers’ removal. Once again, Withers marched back into court to 
continue his noisy ‘sit-in’. The magistrate ordered his arrest. According to 
The Parramatta Chronicle, Withers resisted, ‘boxing with a Constable in 
the dock’, while demanding to know, ‘in a loud voice … the charge against 
him’.39 A charge of ‘disorder in the Court’ was muttered from bench to bar, 
and Chief Constable Fox quickly prepared and read it on to the record. 
From the dock, Withers chimed, ‘and don’t go too fast, I need to write this 
down’.40 Withers’ claims for fair trial rights did not stop there. He 
demanded ‘an hour’s time’ to prepare, ‘and pen, ink and paper’ so that he 
might properly answer the charges against him.41 
Withers’ claims here are significant proof of popular grassroots support 
for the codification of fair trial rights in the colony: a project that was well 
underway in the metropole, resulting in the passing of the Jervis Acts 1848. 
The Acts were primarily designed to protect magistrates from appeal and 
prosecution by wrongly convicted defendants.42 They did not operate in 
 
37  TPC, 31 May 1845, 2. 
38  TPC, 31 May 1845, 2. 
39  TPC, 7 June 1845, 2. 
40  TPC, 7 June 1845, 2. 
41  TPC, 7 June 1845, 2. 
42  The long title of the Act was: ‘An Act to adopt and apply certain Acts of Parliament passed 
for facilitating the performance of the Duties of Justices of the Peace and for protecting 
them from vexatious actions and to prevent persons convicted of offences from taking 
undue advantage of mere defects or errors in form [2nd October, 1850]’ (14 Vict. No. 43). 
The preamble to the Act noted that ‘the adoption of these several Acts … would not only 
tend greatly to the ease of Magistrates … but to the advancement of Justice in respect of 
all proceedings by and before them out of sessions’ (14 Vict. No. 43) (hereafter The Jervis 
Acts – Summary Act). 
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this way in NSW, however, mostly due to law reform campaigning by 
grassroots radicals like Withers and their high-powered allies, such as 
Robert Nichols, the constitutional radical, lawyer and local member for the 
predominantly working-class electorate of Northumberland Boroughs 
(which included Parramatta).43 In NSW, the Jervis Acts succeeded in 
recognising the fair trial rights of criminal defendants more effectively 
than in Britain. As labour historians Adrienne Merritt and Rob McQueen 
demonstrate, in the period following the enactment of the Acts, workers 
flocked to the courts to negotiate their grievances and defend themselves 
from criminal prosecution.44 Likewise, historian Hilary Golder has argued 
that the Acts assisted criminal defendants by increasing the powers of 
legally qualified stipendiary magistrates. For instance, the Acts allowed 
‘stipendiaries’ to act alone, handing them more power than their 
‘honorary’ counterparts who were required to act on benches of no less 
than two justices.45 Building upon these studies, my own findings 
demonstrate that working-class criminal defendants consistently referred 
to ‘fair rules’ of procedure in court. These defendants reminded 
magistrates about ‘hearsay’ and corroborative evidence, railed against the 
hard-swearing of police constables and performed short but effective 
pleas in mitigation.46  
The Jervis Acts also enforced strict descriptions of ‘property’ for all theft 
charges.47 They officially sanctioned the common law rule discharging a 
 
43  The difference between the operation of the Jervis Acts in NSW and Great Britain is 
supported by the work of A.S. Merritt, ‘The Development and Application of Masters and 
Servants Legislation in New South Wales – 1845 to 1930,’ (PhD diss., Australian National 
University, 1981); and Rob McQueen, ‘Master and Servant Legislation as “Social Control”: 
The Role of Law in Labour Relations on the Darling Downs 1860–1870,’ Law in Context, 
10.1 (1992): 123-39.  
44  Merritt, ‘Masters and Servants Legislation’; McQueen, ‘Master and Servants Legislation 
as “Social Control”’. 
45  See Golder, High and Responsible Office, 65, 75, particularly following the Justices Act 
Amendment Act 1853 (17 Vict. No. 39). 
46  For an example of the use of the hearsay rule by a convict, see the trial of John Hall, 21 
September 1829, Bench Books [Picton Court of Petty Sessions] 1829–33, SRNSW, Series 
3315, Reel 671. See also the plea of Catherine Hudgy, reported in TPC, 13 January 1844 
and 20 January 1844. For an example of cross-examination by an accused bushranger of 
a police witness and exposure of lies, corroboration of lies and the manufacture of 
forensic evidence, see R v Fowler and others [1835] NSWSupC 42, Sydney Herald, 18 May 
1835. 
47  The Jervis Acts – Summary Act, cl. 4. 
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defendant upon non-appearance of prosecution witnesses.48 Prosecutors 
were not permitted to rely on evidence of the defendant’s character 
during a hearing.49 A prosecutor could be sued if the information was 
dismissed.50 Amending legislation in 1849 required petty sessions to be 
held in ‘fit and proper places’, preventing justices from convening courts 
in public houses and the private estates of country squatters.51 In Withers’ 
quotes referred to above, we see a reference to some of the key provisions 
of the Jervis Acts: the right to depositions when faced with offences 
requiring bail or imprisonment, and the right of the accused to an 
adjournment or reasonable preparation time to meet the case against 
them.52  
The summary hearing in Withers’ case commenced on an afternoon in 
early June 1845, the same day as his arrest. The magistrate questioned 
Withers as to his defence. In reply, Withers ‘leaned over the Bar’, giving 
the impression ‘that he was about to jump from the box to the bench’ and 
‘told the Police Magistrate he was unfit [to hear the case] and ought not to 
be on the Bench’.53 Withers was fined £80. Unable to pay, he was 
immediately sent to gaol. A month later, Withers had served his sentence. 
In July 1845, he agitated about his conviction before ‘nearly all the 
Magistrates of the District’ at the monthly Sydney Quarter Sessions in 
Parramatta.54 But at Withers’ first interruption, the Chairman (of Quarter 
Sessions) accused him of committing a crime. Withers interrupted twice 
more, The Parramatta Chronicle recalls, ‘asserting that he had committed 
none’ and that if he had, ‘he desired to be put on trial’.55 Withers was 
ejected from the court and refused further entry.  
 
48  The Jervis Acts – Summary Act, cl. 13. 
49  The Jervis Acts – Summary Act, cl. 14. 
50  The Jervis Acts – Summary Act, cl. 26  
51  Petty Sessions Act 12 and 13 Vict. c 18 (1849). 
52  The Jervis Acts – Summary Act, cl. 27 and 3; The Jervis Acts – Summary Act, cl. 13 (following 
the 1853 amendment). 
53  TPC, 7 June 1845, 2. 
54  TPC, 5 July 1845, 3. 
55  TPC, 5 July 1845, 3. 
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Withers’ Experiments with ‘Community Legal Aid’ 
In August 1845, a local man, Peter Rooney, was charged and tried for the 
offence of ‘assaulting a Constable in the execution of his duty’.56 The 
accused claimed police had ‘rough-handled him’ following an argument.57 
Rooney asserted self-defence. Rooney’s wife was the only eyewitness, but 
she was prohibited from giving evidence because the court assumed she 
would only corroborate Rooney’s story.58 The following day, Rooney was 
escorted from the police watch-house to the courthouse to commence 
proceedings. On the way, he came across Withers. According to police, 
Withers ‘enquired of him if he wanted a lawyer, and whether he would 
have either Mr Charles Lyons or Mr Lambton’, two reputable local 
counsel.59 After a short conversation, Withers advised Rooney to go with 
Lambton and, according to police, ‘ran off to that gentleman’s office’, while 
‘ordering Rooney, by no means, to stir until he brought Mr L. to him’.60 In 
other words, Withers advised Rooney, first of all, of his right to counsel 
and, second, of his right to silence. At this, police reported that ‘Rooney … 
got very violent and was unwilling to come on’ into court.61 Later that 
afternoon, Withers shared a court cell with Rooney.  
Withers was charged with ‘inciting a prisoner in custody of Police to resist 
them in the execution of their duty’.62 He pleaded ‘not guilty’ and objected 
to the jurisdiction of the court, presumably on the basis that the 
prosecutor and possibly even the bench were witnesses in the prosecution 
case and held a conflict of interest. Withers suggested that there were 
other police magistrates in nearby districts who could just as easily have 
heard the matter.63 But Magistrate Elliot decided that the case could ‘only 
be adjudged by the Police Magistrate … under the Town Police Act’. 
Withers retorted, ‘it is not delicate of you to sit, Sir’.64 During his hearing, 
 
56  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
57  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
58  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
59  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
60  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
61  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
62  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
63  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
64  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
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Withers continued his protest against the perceived conflict of interest, 
objecting to being cross-examined by Chief Constable Fox. He also 
objected to the Clerk of the Court being called as a prosecution witness, 
asserting that he was ‘not receiving a fair trial’ and that neither had 
Rooney. He continued, ‘if others were of the same opinion as him, Rooney 
should not go to the watch-house’.65  
For his final act that day, Withers closely studied the charges against him 
(which he had carefully written down with ‘ink, pen and paper’) and 
discovered an error that proved fatal to the prosecution case. The offence 
was alleged to have been committed in Church Street, rather than outside 
the court on George Street — where the Parramatta Local Court remains 
to this day.66 The magistrate specifically instructed the constables to 
refuse Withers ‘any future admissions into the Court House’.67 In his 
acquittal, Withers paid homage to the rules of strict pleading, a respect for 
the power and importance of the rule of law to democratic ideals, which 
favoured the liberty of the subject. As nineteenth-century jurist James 
Stephen commented, rules of strict pleading and technicality ‘were … 
popular, as they did mitigate, though in an irrational, capricious manner, 
the excessive severity of the old criminal law’.68 
From the 1820s to the 1840s in Britain, English Chartists and trade 
unionists developed a practice of petitioning and protesting individual 
magistrates in superior courts.69 As social historian Christopher Frank 
argues, procedural law and technicality were the cornerstone of this legal 
resistance, and represented a significant political challenge to the class 
power of employers and their fellow magistrates.70 Like Frank, social 
historian Paula-Jane Byrne concludes that for solicitors in colonial NSW, 
 
65  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
66  The Parramatta Magistrate’s Court has existed in five separate buildings in Parramatta 
since 1826. Four of those buildings, including the 1826 Courthouse, were located within 
two blocks of each other on George Street.  
67  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
68  James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1883/2014), 284. See also John Hostetter, The Politics of 
Criminal Law Reform in the 19th Century (Chichester: Barry Rose Law Publishing, 1992), 
150. 
69  Christopher Frank, Master and Servant Law (Burlington: Ashgate, 2010), 44, 47. 
70  Frank, Master and Servant Law, 44, 47. 
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‘legal technicalities were the prime mode of defending cases’.71 My 
research reveals that legal victories by criminal defendants (and their 
representatives) primarily involved challenging the form of information. 
This method involved finding errors or omissions in the description of 
offences, jurisdiction, warrant or summons, or proving that an arresting 
official or employer had broken a procedural or contractual rule. Even if 
conviction ensued, evidence of technical flaws in the prosecution case 
could mitigate a sentence of imprisonment toward a non-custodial 
outcome, such as a fine.72 Other uses of procedure by working-class 
defendants included issuing writs of habeas corpus or certiorari to the 
Supreme Court to appeal inferior court decisions. Appeals to higher courts 
had two main effects. They immediately disciplined magistrates for 
procedural impropriety and exposed them to costs for false imprisonment 
claims. In the long-term, appeals meant that defendants were able to 
change the law at summary level to address social problems.  
Assertions of procedural technicality were assisted by a doctrine of strict 
legalism, enforced by statute and insisted upon by many lawyers and 
judges.73 It should be noted that the lawyers and judges who conformed to 
strict legalism had a politics of their own, which often reflected popular 
tenets of constitutional or Tory Radicalism.74 According to some 
commentators, when applied in the courtroom, strict legalism could mean 
that technical rules governing indictments, for instance, were ‘convoluted 
and little short of Byzantine’.75 Indeed, in some English cases, it was not 
uncommon for prosecutors to take up to two days to read a single 
indictment, after having drafted up to seventy alternative counts in 
respect to a single crime to ensure that every conceivable version of 
events was provided for.76 In NSW, defendants were sometimes acquitted 
 
71  Byrne, Criminal Law and Colonial Subject, 269. 
72  See, for example, R v Clarke and others [1821] NSWKR 3; [1821] NSWSupC 3; R v O’Hara, 
R v Coulton, R v Read, in the Sydney Gazette, 17 February 1821. 
73  See Letters of Patent pursuant to the Act 4 Geo. IV, c.96 (New South Wales Act), ‘The 
Third’ Charter of Justice 1823 (UK). 
74  For analysis of Tory Radicalism, see E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working 
Class (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1963), 90. 
75  David Plater, ‘The Development of the Role of the Prosecuting Lawyer in the Criminal 
Process: “Partisan Persecutor” or “Minister of Justice”?’, ANZLH E-Journal (2006): 36. 
76  See, for instance, R v Grace (1846) 2 Cox CC 101, cited in Stephen, A History of the Criminal 
Law of England, 287. 
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when their name was misspelt or innocently miscommunicated in an 
indictment.77 For Whig legal historians such as Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephen, these rules created an ‘irrational system’, which meant that ‘the 
law relating to indictments was much as if some small proportion of 
prisoners convicted had been allowed to toss up for their liberty’.78 Indeed 
they had. Fifty years earlier, many reformers used technicality to 
humanise a barbaric procedural system in which ‘too much truth meant 
too much death’.79 As Withers realised in the 1840s, technicality was the 
only fair and strategic legal response to arbitrary imprisonment. 
Two days after protesting Rooney’s case, Withers continued his protest in 
the street outside the courthouse. Chief Constable Fox arrested him and 
dragged him into the courtroom. Curiously, Withers stood charged not 
with a public order offence, but with ‘perjury’, a serious offence arising 
from an alleged misuse of courtroom procedure in Rooney’s case. 
Committal proceedings were commenced against Withers immediately. 
The Chief Constable recalled Rooney’s victim (a police constable) to give 
evidence. In the witness box, the constable swore that Mr Withers had 
‘behaved in a very violent and disrespectful manner’.80 This was enough 
to satisfy the magistrate that there was a case to answer. Withers was 
committed to stand trial for perjury at the next quarter sessions. At this, 
Withers ‘sneered and stamped’ in court.81 Withers was obviously 
indignant about being committed to trial on evidence from a constable 
about behaviour that did not even resemble perjury. Magistrate Elliot 
responded by remanding Withers at Parramatta Gaol until the sitting of 
the next quarter sessions (a fortnight). Bail was set at £80, roughly four 
times the average yearly income.82 It is not clear how this incident was 
 
77  See R v Guyse [1828] NSWSupC 29, The Australian, 9 May 1829. 
78  Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 284. 
79  Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, 6. 
80  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
81  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. 
82  TPC, 23 August 1845, 3. A note on average earnings: in 1838, the compositors’ union 
achieved an annual yearly salary of 5s 5d for its workers. This work was skilled labour, 
however, and likely reflects a significantly higher annual income than in unskilled 
industries such as the pastoral industry, in which the bulk of the colony’s workforce were 
employed. Connell and Irving estimate that a rate of £20 per year, plus rations, could be 
regarded as a typical rate for pastoral workers in the 1820s and 1830s: Connell and 
Irving, Class Structure in Australian History, 42-43. 
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resolved, but given that the next quarter sessions were two weeks later, it 
is safe to assume that Withers served at least two weeks’ imprisonment 
— possibly longer — for his civic activism. 
Withers Trialled for ‘Dangerous Lunacy’ 
Withers reappeared in Parramatta Court on 15 November 1845 to 
complain about the behaviour of Constable Ryan of the Parramatta Police. 
As usual, he was ejected from the court. The Parramatta Chronicle noted 
that ‘Mr Withers … submitted to the expulsion [from court] with the air of 
a patriotic martyr’.83 At this stage, Withers had evolved into something of 
a local hero. This was also a time when ‘Captain Swing’ was in full flight in 
the suburbs of Sydney.84 In the same week, Timothy Horrigan from Canada 
Bay — possibly one of the Canadian rebels expelled by the English in 1837 
— was accused of setting fire to a hayrick at a farm in Five Dock.85 
Horrigan had been dismissed from employment at the farm the night 
before.86 The Parramatta Chronicle conjoined the stories of Withers and 
Horrigan in the same editorial.87 This set the stage for Withers’ final 
incendiary showdown with the justices of Parramatta, in the name of 
fairness and liberty.  
Withers reappeared at the quarter sessions the following month. No 
sooner had he bowed and entered the courtroom than two of the honorary 
magistrates, George Forbes Esq. and Dr Anderson, ordered Withers to be 
arrested. They signed a warrant committing him to Parramatta Gaol to 
await proceedings under the new Dangerous Lunatics Act 1843, to be 
certified as insane and detained indefinitely.88 Chief Justice Stephen would 
decide whether Withers was a ‘dangerous lunatic’ in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act. Section 1 prescribed involuntary detention of a 
 
83  TPC, 15 November 1845, 3. 
84  ‘Captain Swing’ was the anonymous name penned to a series of threatening letters sent 
to employers by aggrieved agricultural workers during the English ‘Swing Riots’ in the 
1830s. Arson (targeting hayricks and barns) was the primary weapon used by labourers 
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Pantheon Books, 1968). 
85  For an account of the Canadian rebels in Canada Bay, see Tony Moore, Death or Liberty: 
Rebel Exiles in Australia, 1788–1868 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2010), vi, 435-36. 
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87  TPC, 15 November 1845, 3. 
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person who was arrested ‘under circumstances denoting a derangement 
of mind and a purpose of committing suicide or some crime’.89 In order to 
commit the person to an asylum, the Act required that two justices hear 
evidence from two medical practitioners that the person ‘is a dangerous 
idiot or dangerous lunatic’.90 The person was then to be confined in strict 
custody until discharged on the order of two justices or a Supreme Court 
judge, or removed to a public asylum.91  
The Dangerous Lunatics Act connected the medical and legal professions 
through the criminal law in a way not seen since the Tyburn surgeons.92 
In the 1840s it was the asylum, rather than the gallows, that conjoined the 
professions in their ordering of colonial society. As cultural historian 
Stephen Garton has found in Medicine and Madness, the asylum was part 
of a shift toward ‘regularising’ the colonial population at a time when the 
professional medical class preached ‘moral reform’ of those minds (not 
bodies) that threatened Victorian social order.93 Back in the metropole, the 
political class was rocked by McNaughton’s Case.94 In January 1843, 
Scottish wood turner Daniel McNaughton shot and killed the Prime 
Minister’s personal secretary. At McNaughton’s murder trial, a number of 
eminent psychiatrists gave evidence that McNaughton suffered paranoid 
delusions. He was acquitted. Queen Victoria herself ordered the Law Lords 
to re-examine the findings.95 They did, and extrapolated on Coke’s 
longstanding doctrine of ‘non compos mentis’ to structure and develop 
‘insanity’ as a modern criminal defence to murder.96 McNaughton was 
confined to Broadmoor Lunatic Asylum. The following year, asylum 
 
89  Dangerous Lunatics Act 7 Vict. No. 14 (1843) (NSW).  
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numbers in Britain increased sixfold.97 As Garton and Mark Finnane have 
found, the 1843 legislation was primarily concerned with 
‘dangerousness’.98 Mental illness had not yet entered the discourse.99 If 
those rendered ‘mad’ were dangerous, one of the ultimate consequences 
of institutionalisation in this period was permanent or long-term 
‘incapacitation’.100 NSW asylums were places of constant surveillance, 
brutality and privation. As the Catholic Bishop of Hobart, Dr R.W. Wilson, 
said of one of the earliest asylums in New South Wales — the Tarban Creek 
facility on the Parramatta River — it ‘contravened every tenet of human 
treatment’.101 The asylum was a prison for the mad. 
At Withers’ ‘insanity’ hearing, more than forty witnesses were called to 
give evidence on both sides. Every policeman and magistrate in the district 
swore that Withers was of ‘unsound mind’.102 Of the ten medical witnesses, 
six doctors agreed with their fellow gentlemen on the bench that Mr 
Withers was, in fact, ‘mad’.103 Two doctors positively stated that Withers 
was sane. The remaining two could not positively provide a diagnosis. 
According to The Australian — which began covering the case once it 
entered the superior jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:  
no two of them [medical experts] agreed in their opinion as to 
the phase his insanity had assumed. Scarcely one of them 
could define the class of insanity which he attributed, and all 
supported their different opinions, by theories equally 
unintelligible and inconsistent.104  
To make matters worse, Withers was prevented from cross-examining the 
prosecution witnesses.105 
 
97  Garton, Medicine and Madness, 16. 
98  Garton, Medicine and Madness, 16; Mark Finnane, ‘From Dangerous Lunatic to Human 
Rights,’ in ‘Madness’ in Australia: Histories, Heritage and the Asylum, ed. Catherine 
Coleborne and Dolly MacKinnon (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2003), 23-33. 
99  Finnane, ‘From Dangerous Lunatic to Human Rights,’ 26-27. 
100  Finnane, ‘From Dangerous Lunatic to Human Rights,’ 24. 
101  Garton, Medicine and Madness, 21.  
102  TPC, 20 December 1845, 2. 
103  TPC, 20 December 1845, 2. 
104  The Australian, 20 December 1845, 4. 
105  The Australian, 20 December 1845, 4. 
Schofield-Georgeson: ‘Mad’ Edwin Withers  
 
97 
Meanwhile, eighteen lay witnesses — all Parramatta locals — were 
‘unanimously of the opinion that he was of sound mind, and had been ill-
treated by the Police’.106 Some of their insights into Withers’ disposition 
are telling. Under examination by Withers, one said, ‘your ill-treatment 
was common talk … I do not think that every obstinate man is mad’.107 This 
was corroborated by another witness who said that he ‘saw [Withers] 
handled more like a felon [by Police] than any other’.108 Another stated 
that Withers was ‘a very clever, shrewd intellectual man, never saw him 
violent, don’t think him mad, he is eccentric, puts himself in curious ways 
and laughs, is very off-handed’.109 Yet another identified Withers as an 
activist, saying he is ‘sometimes cranky and attends meetings’.110 A further 
witness found Withers to be a ‘sober, industrious man, perfectly 
rational’.111 One witness recognised that Withers was on trial for his 
political activism, observing that Withers was ‘very much of the French 
disposition, if he is mad, almost every French-man is mad’.112  
As to Withers’ sanity, no lesser counsel than the Solicitor-General William 
Manning told the court that he did ‘not consider him more mad than I am” 
and that the “ill-treatment he saw by Police would make any man 
insane’.113 Manning noted that Withers had been ‘pulled and dragged 
about as no man ought to be … pushed off the Portico and down the steps, 
advised to be quiet’. While Manning conceded that ‘he is such an irritable 
sort of man’, he nevertheless empathised with Withers’ struggle against 
police corruption and feckless summary procedure. As Manning told the 
court, ‘what we see one day and is sworn the next [by the police] is almost 
disgusting for any honest man to sit and hear it [and] I have addressed Mr 
Elliot myself [on this point]’.114  
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The Chaplain of the Parramatta Gaol told the court that Withers had said, 
‘they’ve sent me here as a madman’ and that ‘the Church was too high for 
him and he confined himself to reading for four months’.115 But it was 
nevertheless the view of the clergyman that ‘they were unacquainted with 
a radical in Parramatta and wondered why Dan O’Connell [the Irish Rebel 
leader] was not confined’, too.116  
Finally, Withers addressed the bench by stating that he ‘had done so much 
good in Parramatta that the Magistrates sat to empty benches’.117 Chief 
Justice Stephen and Justice Dickinson summed up the evidence. According 
to The Australian, the Chief Justice formed ‘his opinion that Mr Withers 
was [in fact] sane’ but deferred to the opinion of the medical men.118 The 
Supreme Court committed Withers to the Tarban Creek Lunatic Asylum at 
Gladesville, indefinitely. The admissions register at the asylum claims that 
Withers entered the institution suffering ‘partial intellectual mania’.119 
By this time, however, ‘the Lunacy Case’ — as it had become known in the 
mainstream press — had caught the attention of some of the colony’s 
highest ranking law men.120 The following week, Robert Nichols applied to 
the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus to have Withers released 
from Tarban Creek. Nichols pointed out to Justice A’Beckett that an 
application could be made for release under the new Act if signed by two 
legal practitioners.121 Nichols visited Withers at the asylum. 
Unsurprisingly, Withers had already synthesised his grounds of appeal. As 
he told Nichols, the justices at Parramatta had detained him pursuant to a 
mere order, not by warrant complete with a certificate, signed and sealed 
by each justice. Nor did the justices find Withers to be a ‘dangerous lunatic, 
or dangerous idiot’ in accordance with Section 1 of the Act.  The warrant 
did, however, state that Withers was of ‘unsound mind and not safe to go 
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at large’.122 Incidentally, the requirement that magistrates document all 
cases of imprisonment and the movement of prisoners by warrant was a 
further procedural right to emerge from the implementation of the Jervis 
Acts in NSW by Robert Nichols, some years later.123 Other procedural 
errors in the document included a failure to note: i) who committed 
Withers; ii) how he was proved insane; and iii) the signature of two 
qualified medical practitioners.  
These grounds were agitated before Justice A’Beckett of the NSW Supreme 
Court the following week. A’Beckett found that ‘the whole thing appeared 
to be as illegal as it possibly could be’.124 After consulting with two other 
judges of the court, Chief Justice Stephen and Justice Dickinson, A’Beckett 
quashed the warrant of commitment. Withers was discharged on 22 
December 1845. The Sydney Morning Herald was moved to write, ‘we ... 
award our humble meed of praise to the Judges, who, particularly 
investigated this extra-ordinary transaction and would not allow 
themselves to be duped by the crude sophisms and unsupported theories 
of men nicknamed “medical”’.125  
The conventionally conservative Sydney Morning Herald celebrated 
Withers’ radical triumph beneath the banner, ‘Sworn to no master, of no 
sect am I’.126 Following the incident, the Cumberland Times reported that 
the committing justices ‘attempted to absolve themselves from blame 
respecting the missing warrant’, and the Crown prosecutor at the 
Supreme Court proceedings resigned from his office.127  
This incident did not deter Withers from his civic activism campaign for 
fair trial rights in Parramatta. Days after his release from Tarban Creek, he 
was arrested yet again while monitoring police procedure outside 
Parramatta Courthouse and advising criminal defendants of their rights to 
due process.128 By this time, however, his activism was catching on, 
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particularly among the middle-class residents of Parramatta. The 
witnesses who supported Withers during his Supreme Court trial clearly 
show that he did not act alone. One Parramatta resident, Charles 
Blakefield, wrote to Governor Gipps to explain that the latest episode 
involving Withers was ‘a case of unparalleled oppression’.129 As 
importantly, Blakefield claimed support for Withers’ activism among not 
only the working-class defendants of the Parramatta district but from ‘the 
respectable portion of the inhabitants of Parramatta’. He reiterated the 
basic facts of the case, telling the Governor that Withers had ‘this day again 
been incarcerated for merely attempting to go outside the courthouse’. 
Blakefield continued, ‘I humbly suggest to your Excellency, the necessity 
of a judicial investigation as the respectable portion of the inhabitants of 
Parramatta are of opinion that he [Withers] is and has been previously, 
illegally confined’. The ‘respectable’ men and women of Parramatta were 
equally appalled by the irony that after fighting so hard for the legal rights 
and representation of the most vulnerable members of the Parramatta 
community, Withers himself was now ‘not … able to pay a barrister’ to 
represent himself in the Supreme Court.130 Governor Gipps took the 
complaint seriously. His comments on Blakefield’s letter show that, while 
reluctant to interfere with judicial power, the Governor forwarded the 
letter to all three judges of the New South Wales Supreme Court in 
Sydney.131  
Withers was released shortly after the letter had been circulated at the 
highest levels of colonial government. His struggle continued throughout 
the remainder of the decade. By 1846, his confrontations with authority 
had brought poverty upon his family. Not only was he unable to afford 
counsel, he was repeatedly imprisoned as a result of being unable to pay 
bail sureties.132 Between 1846 and 1847, he served numerous prison 
sentences in Parramatta Gaol. Upon his final admission to Parramatta Gaol 
in 1847, Withers staged a hunger strike for five to six weeks to protest his 
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imprisonment in respect of his advocacy work.133 News of the strike did 
not travel past the gaol walls, and authorities at the gaol appear to have 
used the strike to confirm Withers’ ‘madness’. He was once again 
transferred to Tarban Creek Lunatic Asylum, which would become his 
regular place of confinement following all court protests he staged 
thereafter.134 ‘Mad’ Edwin Withers was last admitted to Tarban Creek in 
1852 at the age of forty-four, as a ‘pauper’.135 The incidents at Parramatta 
clearly left Withers a broken man, and the details of the remainder of his 
life are unknown. 
Withers’ Impact on Legal Reform 
Withers’ case led to a public inquiry into the management of NSW public 
asylums. The 1846 Select Committee Inquiry into the Tarban Creek 
Lunatic Asylum condemned the brutality with which the institution was 
run and recommended the appointment of a medical superintendent to 
oversee the treatment of patients.136 The post was formalised in 1848.  
Withers’ case, however, was not limited to reforming the asylum system.  
As discussed above, his case (and many like it) had wider implications for 
procedural reform to the criminal law in NSW. In July 1850, Robert Nichols 
voiced identical arguments to those of ‘Mad’ Mr Withers in the NSW 
Legislative Council. Upon implementation of the British Jervis Acts by 
Attorney-General John Plunkett, Nichols argued that the Acts should be 
amended to make copies of charges and information available to 
defendants for free, rather than for a fee of 3 and 1/2 pence for each folio 
of ninety words. He was outvoted eleven to one.137 Nichols ‘agreed in 
principle’ with the adoption of the Acts ‘but thought it inexpedient to 
resort to this wholesale system of legislation’.138 Rather, Nichols 
contended that ‘the adaptation of English law to local circumstances was 
the proper course’.139 Nichols’ objections forced Plunkett to redraft the 
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certain provisions of the Bill protecting magistrates from prosecution by 
aggrieved litigants and defendants. Nichols did this in consultation with 
the Chief Justice, who gave ‘his most laborious attention … to adapt the 
English provisions to the circumstances of the colony’.140 The resulting Bill 
was, in Plunkett’s words, ‘more efficient and more safe than the measures 
introduced by the members opposite’.141 Four days after the Act had come 
into force, Chief Justice Stephen described it as being ‘of more importance, 
as affecting the administration of justice, than any other Statute passed by 
the Colonial Legislature’.142 The Chief Justice continued  
the duties of a Justice of the Peace … were clearly defined; and 
while magistrates were protected from all vexatious actions, 
there were means provided by which all those who were affected 
by magisterial proceedings could protect themselves against 
error or injustice, by resorting to a most simple and 
inexpensive proceeding of a summary nature, by which the 
intervention of the Supreme Court would be obviated.143  
Nichols argued to amend the Jervis Acts again in 1853, apparently with 
little consultation from the conservative members of the Legislative 
Council. In August, Nichols introduced a seemingly innocuous Bill into the 
Legislative Council, under the unsuspecting name of the Prohibition and 
Amendment Bill. Under this title, the Bill and its contents appear to have 
been hidden from the scrutiny of the Legislative Council and the 
conservative press. Upon the first reading of the Bill in parliament, Nichols 
omitted both short and long titles of the legislation. Obtusely, he noted 
that the Bill was intended ‘to amend, the Act 11th Victoria No. 43’.144 The 
second and third readings of the Bill occurred late in the evening between 
August and October 1853. Only upon the third reading did Nichols 
announce his intention to amend the name of the Act to the ‘Justices Act 
Amendment Act’.145 By this stage, it is unlikely that the other members of 
the Council would have seriously contemplated, much less read, the 
 
140  SMH, 27 July 1850, 3. 
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contents of the Act. No debate was had, nor questions put, and the 
amending Act was passed on 7 October 1853 as the Justices Act 
Amendment Act (17 Vict. No. 39). Once again, Nichols’ arguments echoed 
the demands of Withers at the Parramatta Magistrates Court in 1845: time 
to prepare, enhanced appeal rights and diminished power for honorary 
justices all featured prominently.  
Conclusion 
The story of ‘Mad’ Edwin Withers illustrates that the criminal law was not 
merely an instrument of social control but part of a more complex 
hegemonic apparatus that could be reformed through democratic 
traditions of dissent. Many rights and freedoms in colonial NSW were 
created from the bottom up, often in the interests of predominantly 
working-class people, who were the objects of criminal law. They and 
their legal representatives worked within an overwhelmingly harsh and 
repressive criminal justice system to reform the law to protect the 
vulnerable from the powerful. Just as law was imposed from above, 
institutionalising, ordering and regularising a colonial population, so was 
it resisted from below, in the streets, courtrooms and colonial legislature. 
Civil liberties in the colony of NSW were hard-won and shaped by the 
resistance of the people; people like Withers. 
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